_Sufi Castigator_ investigates the writings of Ahmad Kasravi, one of the foremost intellectuals in Iran. It studies his work within the context of Sufism in modern Iran and mystical Persian literature and includes translations of Kasravi’s writings. Kasravi provides a fascinating topic for those with interests in Sufism and Iranian studies as he attempted to produce a form of Iranian identity that he believed was compatible with the modern age and Iranian nationalism. His stress on reason and the de-mystification of (...) religion caused him to repudiate Sufism and much of the Sufi literary heritage as backwards and believed it a reason for the weakness of modern Iran. Kasravi’s historical observations were weak, and his writings indicate that he was working towards pre-determined conclusions. However, his works are of significance because they contributed to a major discussion in the 1930s to 1940s about the ideal image and identity that Iranians should adopt. Despite the academic weaknesses of Kasravi’s works he had a profound effect on the next generation of thinkers. _Sufi Castigator_ is stimulating and meticulously researched book and includes two lengthy translations of Kasravi’s works, _Sufism_ and _What does Hafez Say?_ and will appeal to scholars of middle eastern studies. (shrink)

1. In one sense, Herbert Marcuse seems like the sort of theorist whose significance would be fleeting. A generation coming of age in a world of tumult, rebelling against authority, against the Establishment, needed an authority—needed a father. Marcuse appeared to be the perfect fit: reaching the desired conclusions using an authorizing language that was sophisticated but radical . The machinery of Marcuse's critical theory had been developed by his….

This is a collection of 13 essays which focus on a theme to which Crossett dedicated much of his highly interdisciplinary research. Six essays concern Hamartia in Greek works by Herodotus, Plato, Euripides, and others; two deal with the concept of error in the Christian theology of Boethius and Aquinas; and five examine Hamartia in 14th-19th-century English works by Chaucer, Shakespeare, Coleridge, and George Eliot.

"A translation of Plotinus' Enneads V.5: "That the Intelligibles are not External to the Intellect, and on the Good," with an introduction and philosophical commentary. Platonists beginning in the Old Academy itself and up to and including Plotinus struggled to understand and articulate the relation between Plato's Demiurge and the Living Animal which served as the model for creation. The treatise V.5 [32] sets out the case for the internality of Forms to the Intellect that the Demiurge is and argues (...) for the necessary existence of an absolutely simple and transcendent first principle of all, the One or the Good"--. (shrink)

The neurosciences have advanced to the point that we can now treat consciousness as a scientific problem like any other. The problem is to explain how brain processes cause consciousness and how consciousness is realized in the brain. Progress is impeded by a number of philosophical mistakes, and the aim of this paper is to remove nine of those mistakes: (i) consciousness cannot be defined; (ii) consciousness is subjective but science is objective; (iii) brain processes cannot explain consciousness; (iv) the (...) problem of ‘qualia’ should be set aside; (v) consciousness is epiphenomenal; (vi) consciousness has no evolutionary function; (vii) a causal account of consciousness is necessarily dualistic; (viii) science is reductionistic, so a scientific account of consciousness would show it reducible to something else; and (ix) an account of consciousness must be an information processing account. (shrink)

In this closely argued monograph, the author examines one chapter of Plotinus’s treatise V.3 [49], titled “On the Knowing Hypostasis and That Which is Beyond.” In the fifth chapter of that work, Plotinus makes the case for asserting that knowledge is primarily or essentially self-knowledge. This is certainly not a novel claim in the history of ancient philosophy, as Kühn amply demonstrates. It is a central claim in Aristotle’s epistemology and the later Peripatetic tradition. What is of particular interest for (...) the Plotinian account of knowledge as self-knowledge is that it is made in response to a skeptical argument found in Sextus Empiricus, although it is likely that it did not originate with him. That argument attempts to pose the following dilemma for any “dogmatist” who embraces self-knowledge. Either this self-knowledge is in effect one “part” of the knower knowing another “part,” or else it is one “part” knowing not another “part,” but rather knowing “itself.” The first horn of the dilemma means that self-knowledge is not knowledge at all, since the putative knower would have to be able to show that the first “part” is representing the second part accurately. And this is something that cannot be done without the first. (shrink)

Critically discussing the causal social ontologies presented by Dave Elder-Vass and John Searle, the article argues that these views implausibly identify the causal ontological source of human sociality in collectively known, recognized and accepted statuses, criteria, norms and the like. This is implausible, for it ignores human sociality as occurring in temporally and spatially dispersed on-going processes of human interaction of differently placed, often unequal, and thus epistemically differently equipped actors in division of labour. Human scientific concepts are best (...) seen as picking out (aspects of) such complex and heterogeneous processes, not what the participating actors allegedly collectively know, accept or recognize about them. The article observes that similar appeals to collective recognition are also common in Wittgensteinian literature that, however, have claimed to reject the causal ontological view. It is argued that the ultimate value in rejecting the causal ontological view, and the accompanying idea of collective recognition, resides in that we thereby avoid epistemically homogenizing and over-intellectualizing the diverse mass of dispersed, often unequal, but interacting actors. (shrink)

John Searle je profesor filosofie na University of California v Berkeley. Do filosofie se nesmazatelně zapsal již svou ranou teorií řečových aktů , která významně ovlivnila současné pojetí jazyka. Searle v ní klade důraz na mínění mluvčího a posluchače a na roli jejich mínění při ustavování významu. Searlův zájem o mysl a intencionalitu později vyústil v komplexní teorii intencionality a v úvahy o ontologii mysli a vědomí a o začlenění vědomí do světa přírody . Se zájmem o mysl (...) souvisí i slavný argument obvykle nazývaný „čínská místnost“, který je zaměřen proti teorii silné umělé inteligence, tedy proti názoru, že mysl může vzniknout implementací počítačového programu. Úvahy o jazyce a intencionalitě také předznačily Searlovo další velké téma a další originální příspěvek k filosofii – jeho ontologii sociální reality , na níž v současné době dále pracuje. Jiným Searlovým důležitým filosofickým tématem je racionalita . Následující rozhovor se uskutečnil u příležitosti Searlovy návštěvy v Praze ve dnech 8.–11. října 2007, kdy Searle přednesl dvě přednášky na téma sociální reality a úlohy jazyka v jejím ustavování. Za laskavou spolupráci při zpracování rozhovoru patří dík paní Dagmar Searle. (shrink)

Soma‐to‐germline feedback is forbidden under the neo‐Darwinian paradigm. Nevertheless, there is a growing realization it occurs frequently in immunoglobulin (Ig) variable (V) region genes. This is a surprising development. It arises from a most unlikely source in light of the exposure of co‐author EJS to the haplotype data of RL Dawkins and others on the polymorphism of the Major Histocompatibility Complex, which is generally assumed to be the most polymorphic region in the genome (spanning ∼4 Mb). The comparison between the (...) magnitude of MHC polymorphism with estimates for the human heavy chain immunoglobulin V locus (spanning ∼1 Mb), suggests IGHV could be many orders of magnitude more polymorphic than the MHC. This conclusion needs airing in the literature as it implies generational churn and soma‐to‐germline gene feedback. Pedigree‐based experimental strategies to resolve the IGHV issue are outlined. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Searle and the ‘Deep Unconscious’”Dan Lloyd (bio)Can another person know my thoughts with better authority than I know them myself? With his affirmative answer to this question, Freud invented the twentieth-century human, a being whose mind is accessible to scrutiny from outside, and whose attempts at conscious self-explanation are at best partial and in many cases wrong. Even as Freud’s scientific influence wanes, the shift (...) of authority he inaugurated is still gathering strength. Now the mind is open to many outsiders. Not only psychoanalysts, but behaviorists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists are all striving to read my mind, and yours. Against this historical sea change stands the solitary John Searle, whose work is consistently animated by fierce adherence to first person authority and surly attacks of any theory that could be exploited to undermine that authority. To most readers Searle’s positions seem stubbornly anti-scientific and covertly dualistic, despite his insistence to the contrary. And since science is good and dualism is bad, Searle’s arguments have become standing obstacles for theorists to discuss, debate, or dismiss.Buttressing his insistence on first person authority, Searle defends a Cartesian view of mental representation or intentionality, holding that an intentional entity is a conscious entity, either in actuality or potentiality. Deeply unconscious representations are therefore impossible. Eric Gillett has joined the debate just here with a pointed critique of Searle’s argument (also discussed in Lloyd 1990). Gillett performs a double service by challenging Searle’s premises and offering some positive grounds for the deep unconscious. I agree with Gillett that establishing the existence of deeply unconscious representations requires a theory of intentionality that is independent of conscious awareness. Ruth Millikan’s evolutionary teleology is an excellent candidate, in its pursuit of real function and real content (vs. “as-if” interpretation) for mental items.Some questions remain. First, if deeply unconscious entities are clinically important, then in addition to a defense-in-principle of their existence we will need some method of identifying specific deep representations in particular cases. Millikan’s functionalism links content to broad biological and environmental contexts, and thereby seems to be an unwieldy tool for content ascription. If deeply unconscious representations get their content in the way Millikan describes, how can the clinician make use of them?Second, and more important, Millikan’s theory shares with many others the ambition to explain all intentional entities, conscious and unconscious alike. This leads to a new dualism of mental contents, a split between intentional content and conscious content, since the comprehensive theory of intentionality will assign mental content both [End Page 201] shallow and deep, irrespective of consciousness. This is a perplexity that transcends particular theories of intentionality, since what my mental states represent seems at least partly dependent on my environment or context, but my current state of consciousness is exclusively dependent on my brain. How, in theory, can these two concepts of content be reconciled?In sum, deeply unconscious representations do not come cheap. One way to escape the new dualism of content is to deny that the deep entities are representations. Instead, they might be dispositions or the “mechanisms, instinctual drives, structures, and energies which can never become conscious under any conditions,” as Gillett suggests. (In Lloyd 1994 I explore the possibility of a dispositional unconscious understood via connectionism.) On this view, mental content could remain within our first person authority, while the causal processes that manage that content remain out of sight. I wouldn’t have to guess what I’m thinking, but I would depend on the sciences of the mind to tell me how I come to think it.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Searle and the "Deep Unconscious"Commentary: Commentary by LloydDan Lloyd Dan Lloyd, Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 06106, U.S.A.ReferencesLloyd, D. 1990. Loose connections: Four problems with Searle’s argument for the ‘Connection Principle.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13: 615–16. Google ScholarLloyd, D. 1994. Connectionist hysteria: Reducing a Freudian case study to a network model. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 1, no. 2: 69–88. Google ScholarCopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

The Framers understood the Constitution to be the fundamental expression of the rule of law over against the arbitrary, intemperate, and unjust “rule of men” that all too frequently existed in the political world, unfortunately both democratic as well as monarchical. Accordingly, the rule of law requires a well functioning political and legal system that includes legislative checks and balances, the separation of power between the President and Congress, an independent judiciary, federalism, etc. What happens when this “Madisonian” constitutional system, (...) designed to express “the deliberate sense of the community,” runs into a Judicial branch that, in effect, claims we live under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what we say it is. Must the Judiciary itself be subject to the rule of law, and the decisions of a constitutional majority, or does their “independence” extend to being independent of the constraints of the rule of law and, thus, decent majority rule? How did the original John Marshall Court answer these questions, and what light do the leading cases and controversies shed on the relationship between the Marshall Court and the Madisonian System? Are we facing a situation of Marshall v. Madison? (shrink)

Automated reasoning about uncertain knowledge has many applications. One difficulty when developing such systems is the lack of a completely satisfactory integration of logic and probability. We address this problem directly. Expressive languages like higher-order logic are ideally suited for representing and reasoning about structured knowledge. Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth-values. The main technical problem studied in this paper is the following: Given a set of sentences, each having some probability of being (...) true, what probability should be ascribed to other (query) sentences? A natural wish-list, among others, is that the probability distribution (i) is consistent with the knowledge base, (ii) allows for a consistent inference procedure and in particular (iii) reduces to deductive logic in the limit of probabilities being 0 and 1, (iv) allows (Bayesian) inductive reasoning and (v) learning in the limit and in particular (vi) allows confirmation of universally quantified hypotheses/sentences. We translate this wish-list into technical requirements for a prior probability and show that probabilities satisfying all our criteria exist. We also give explicit constructions and several general characterizations of probabilities that satisfy some or all of the criteria and various (counter) examples. We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for extending beliefs about finitely many sentences to suitable probabilities over all sentences, and in particular least dogmatic or least biased ones. We conclude with a brief outlook on how the developed theory might be used and approximated in autonomous reasoning agents. Our theory is a step towards a globally consistent and empirically satisfactory unification of probability and logic. (shrink)

I. Diverse interpretations.--II. Purpose and naturalism.--III. The realities of experience.--IV. An historical controversy.--V. The ideal construction of naturalism.--VI. The web of causation.--VII. The problem of life.--VIII. Mind and mechanism.--IX. The science of metaphysics of will.--X. Genetic psychology.--XI. The metaphysical postulate.--XII. Determinism and purpose.

D. Blumbergi identifies three kinds of moral criticism: (i) of an individual for violating a moral practice in his society, (2) of a moral practice but not the individual who participates in it, and (3) of both an individual and the practice in accordance with which he acts ('practice-personal' criticism) (p. 348). According to Mr. Blumberg, successful derivation of a conclusive 'ought'-statement from statements about socially-created obligations would show how moral criticisms of type 1 are justified. Moral criticisms of type (...) 2 would still be allowed, but not those of type 3. -/- I discuss the following points made by Blumberg: (A) Criticism of type 1 is 'the most common kind of moral judgment' (p. 356); (B) Searle dispensed 'with the conclusive aspect of the conclusion, and with it the finality of the derivation, when it began to seem unrealizable' (p. 356); (C) 'It is impossible to derive conclusive "ought"-statements embodying our traditional moral outlook from statements about socially-created obligations, . . .' (p. 355); (D) 'Either we surrender the attempt to derive a conclusive "ought" -statement from statements about socially-created obligations, or else we must surrender our right to make practice-personal criticisms' (p. 357). -/- I argue that conclusiveness in judgments, both moral and non-moral, is always relative to the range of reasons weighed, the implications of action considered. Therefore 'ought' must always be taken to be context-bound just as moral principles are taken to be defeasible, elliptical. This interpretation of 'ought' and 'conclusive' as bound to a context, point of view or framework, is quite consistent with Searle's distinction between what is internal and external to an institution. (shrink)

Heart disease is the leading cause of death amongst adult Americans and has recently become a top killer worldwide. The direct costs of cardiovascular disease are projected to triple in the next 20 years, from $272.5 billion to $818.1 billion (Heidenreich et al. 2011). Although there has been a decreased incidence and prevalence of ischemic heart disease over the past several decades in the United States, heart failure remains a major cause of morbidity and mortality. In the United States, approximately (...) 500,000 to 700,000 new cases are identified each year (Lloyd-Jones et al. 2009). Heart failure is now the number one diagnosis leading to hospitalization. As such, it is an increasingly heavy economic burden on .. (shrink)

This collection of essays arose directly from a series of seminars conducted at the Institute of Classical Studies of London University during 1967-1968. Most of the material is published for the first time. Articles by Sandbach and Kidd offer arguments concerning kataleptike phantasia as the test of a true presentation, and Posidonius' conception of the role of the emotions in relation to his scientifically based ethical theory. In addition to the positions held by Rist, Sandbach and Kidd, A. C. (...) class='Hi'>Lloyd argues that the Stoic categories, as lekta, should be classified under dialectic and grammar rather than physics. S. G. Pembroke argues most cogently for the central importance of the difficult and controversial concept of oikeiosis in Stoicism. In two essays, editor Long, slanting the conclusion of his discussion of lekta towards its ethical implications, argues first that there is no evidence to show that lekta persist outside of acts of thought and communication distinct from the speaker and his reference; and secondly, that "man," because his logos is equal in quality to all the divine which is outside of it, and because it constitutes a unique substance whose identity is unaffected by external events, "can be free, can act as a man, if and only if the external movements of his body follow from a decision which reconciles his own will and moral choice to what is necessarily the case." Finally, in a not altogether satisfactory concluding essay, "The Natural Law and Stoicism," Gerald Watson discusses among other things some of the practical applications of natural law and its later influence posterior to the Stoic use of it. Although the editor does not attempt either to unify the varying positions presented or to present a comprehensive view of Stoicism, he does bring together some stimulating arguments concerning particular problems in Stoic ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and psychology. This book, truly a statement of "work in progress," is sure to arouse further discussion of the important topics discussed within its carefully documented pages.--T. V. U. (shrink)

The essays in Part I of _Beyond Poststructuralism seek_ to demonstrate fallacies of structuralist and poststructuralist thought that remain potent even though the theoretical structures that led to their enunciation have lost much of their original influence. These fallacies include the idea that one must avoid the consideration of authorial intention; that meanings are undecidable; that there is no justification for seeking unity in a text; that all hierarchies of value are reversible; that history is no more than an open (...) contest among competing narrative constructions; and that the very nature of language makes the falsifiability of statements about human experience impossible. The essays in Part II suggest ways to bring literary study into closer relation with human experience of the world. Their authors emphasize the role of literature in providing new perspectives and broadening the range of available alternatives to what is threatening, unjust, fallacious, or absurd in social and cultural structures. Contributors are Bernard Bergonzi, John Holloway, Wendell V. Harris, A. D. Nuttall, Raymond Tallis, John Searle, Richard Levin, Robert Scholes, James Battersby, David Bromwich, Quentin Kraft, Michael Fischer, Charles Altieri, Christopher Clausen, Gayle Greene, André Lefevere, Daniel R. Schwarz, Virgil Nemoianu, and Martha Nussbaum. (shrink)

The essays in Part I of _Beyond Poststructuralism seek_ to demonstrate fallacies of structuralist and poststructuralist thought that remain potent even though the theoretical structures that led to their enunciation have lost much of their original influence. These fallacies include the idea that one must avoid the consideration of authorial intention; that meanings are undecidable; that there is no justification for seeking unity in a text; that all hierarchies of value are reversible; that history is no more than an open (...) contest among competing narrative constructions; and that the very nature of language makes the falsifiability of statements about human experience impossible. The essays in Part II suggest ways to bring literary study into closer relation with human experience of the world. Their authors emphasize the role of literature in providing new perspectives and broadening the range of available alternatives to what is threatening, unjust, fallacious, or absurd in social and cultural structures. Contributors are Bernard Bergonzi, John Holloway, Wendell V. Harris, A. D. Nuttall, Raymond Tallis, John Searle, Richard Levin, Robert Scholes, James Battersby, David Bromwich, Quentin Kraft, Michael Fischer, Charles Altieri, Christopher Clausen, Gayle Greene, André Lefevere, Daniel R. Schwarz, Virgil Nemoianu, and Martha Nussbaum. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Moving Literary Theory OnWendell V. HarrisParadox has long been especially seductive to literary critics and theorists. For the New Critics, the presence of paradox in a text served to vouch for the complexity and therefore value of the perspective on life the text offered. For poststructuralists it seems to be even more important: paradox is the hallmark of earnestness. And if paradox is good, self-contradiction is even better. That (...) at least would seem to be the reasoning that justifies the amount of internal contradiction to be encountered among the critical principles most in vogue these days. Let us note twelve of the most egregious of these contradictions.(1) New Criticism is dead. But the New Critics’ major activity, the pursuit of the author’s intended meaning through close reading, is still very much with us. However much poststructuralists have wished to deny the importance of or possibility of achieving understanding of authorially intended meaning, their own critical commentary necessarily begins with the meaning the author is assumed to have intended. For instance, that which Derrida seeks to deconstruct or undercut in Saussure, Rousseau, Austin, or Searle begins in what he thinks they intended to say. However, the New Critic sought to resolve apparent contradictions on the principle that the interpretation producing the greatest consistency would be nearest the author’s meaning (since the author was assumed to have assumed that the reader would assume that the author intended a non-contradictory statement). In contrast, the poststructuralist typically seeks to find and emphasize or, if necessary, induce contradiction—but only after having assumed that degree of consonance and unity in the text necessary to interpret the intended meaning within which can be sought the contradictions for the [End Page 428] discovery of which the reading was undertaken. The result is thus more often than not a New Critical reading into which contradictions have been injected. One is reminded of the old story of the student in a short story writing class who told his friend that he had the story all written—all he had to do was go back and put in the symbols. The typical poststructuralist begins with a reading much like what one would expect from a New Critic and then begins inducing contradictions.(2) Literature and language cannot really be about anything beyond themselves. At the same time literature and the language on which it is dependent are regarded as largely constituting that which we experience. If language cannot refer to non-linguistic things and events, either it cannot have the power to shape our classifications, descriptions, and evaluations of things and events experienced, or there exists nothing beyond language—in which case we can abolish poverty, racism, and sexism by denying that those words have any meaning. Moreover, if language is about nothing but itself, any formulation that uses language to make statements denying the relationship of language to anything outside itself must be meaningless.(3) All narratives, indeed all statements about the world, are fictional. Yet “fictional” would have no meaning if it did not stand in contrast to those things that are not fictional, while the distinctions made available by the contrast are ones we can hardly do without. There are narratives (1) that both tellers and their hearers/readers know to be not true (“not to be the case” is the evasive formulation popular with philosophers), (2) that tellers and/or hearers/readers think true though they prove not to be, and (3) that tellers think true and are in fact partially, perhaps largely true, but erroneous in some details and necessarily incomplete. These classifications require a modicum of explanation, but to lose one’s way among them would seem to require a wilful pursuit of confusion.Class 1. Oliver Twist is fictional even though there were workhouses, thieves, and such sites as The Angel and Newgate existing at the time at which the narrative is set. Of course, within a fictional narrative, there may be subnarratives the reader is to regard as true within the total fictional narrative and others that are to be regarded as false. To take a light-hearted example, within the narrative of Gilbert and... (shrink)

The article discusses the diversity of the subject field of the philosophy of war as well as the internal integrity of the discipline, united by the focus on the philosophical understanding of the phenomenon of war. The author shows the role of H. Lloyd, who influenced K. Clausewitz, H. Jomini and their followers’ interpretation of the meaning and content of the subject area of the philosophy of war. In the abundance of specific topics addressed by philosophers of this field, (...) the following topics should be noted: the issue of victory and defeat and their interpretation as well as the issue of historical memory. This problem is projected on contemporaneity and reflects the deep connection between peace and war, the dialectic of their relations. The interpretation of certain military and political events is of real interest in the light of the processes of distortion of historical events that have radically affected the course of history. An analysis of the motives and causes of this process is supposes to reconstruct an objective picture of relations between the subjects of international relations in various periods of history. The author finds answers in already existing concepts that have been developed in our time. It is important to mention the project of the French philosopher Charles Renouvier, who put forward the concept of “uchronia,” which became the starting point for the consideration of historical events in the “subjunctive mood.” This genre of historiosophical fantasy was picked up by famous followers – by the former President of France V. Giscard d’Estaing and others. The article provides eyewitness accounts of historical events that are historical facts and help to understand the true state of things. The article demonstrates that the philosophical study of the problem of war is important for understanding the origins and essence of relations arising from the transition between peaceful and military states. (shrink)

Sequential transformative design of research :224–235, 2015; Groleau et al. in J Mental Health 16:731–741, 2007; Robson and McCartan in Real world research: a resource for users of social research methods in applied settings, Wiley, Chichester, 2016) allows testing a group of theoretical assumptions about the connections of artificial intelligence with culture and education. In the course of research, semiotics ensures the description of self-organizing systems of cultural signs and symbols in terms of artificial intelligence as a special set of (...) algorithms. This approach helps to consider the arguments proposed by Searle :417–457, 1980) against ‘strong’ artificial intelligence. Searle :417–457, 1980) believes that artificial or machine intelligence cannot fully emulate the processes of the human mind. Machine intelligence shows own inevitable weakness. This is non-autonomous tool for computations and data operating. In fact, this tool cannot provide insight into real cognitive conditions. After Lotman and Uspensky, authors expand the meaning of artificial intelligence. The authors identify a cultural type of ‘strong’ artificial intelligence or ‘self-increase of Logos’ in terms by Lotman and Uspensky. The interpretation of human intelligence as imitation of machine intelligence makes possible such immersion of artificial intelligence in culture. The authors reveal a case of self-organizing autonomous generation, encoding, decoding, reception, storage, and transmission of social information in the field of physical training. From the empirical studies it is clear that the organization of collective activities without external control ensures the development of positive emotions and social orientations. Interest in autonomous behavior provides the formation of educational and cognitive motives. As a special set of algorithms, these motives are the most promising and favorable for personal development. (shrink)

Some problems in John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality. I express some doubts about his constitutive v. regulative rule distinction, and press some objections against his unanalysed idea of acceptance or agreement.

Searle proposes an argument in order to prove the existence of universals and thereby solve the problem of universals: From every meaningful general term P(x) follows a tautology Vx[P(x) v -P(x)], which entails the existence of the corresponding universal P. To be convincing, this argument for existence must be valid, it must presume true premises and it must be free of any informal fallacy. First, the validity of the argument for existence in its non-modal interpretation will be proven with (...) the help of the formal deductive system F. Secondly, it will be shown that a self-contradictory tautology concept is employed, which renders the premises meaningless. Consequently, the inconsistency will be emended through redefinition and the argument's ensuing correctness will be demonstrated. Finally, it will be shown that the argument for existence presupposes the existence of universals in its premise and hence begs the question. (shrink)

Knowing Persons is an original study of Plato's account of personhood. For Plato, embodied persons are images of a disembodied ideal. The ideal person is a knower. Hence, the lives of embodied persons need to be understood according to Plato's metaphysics of imagery. For Gerson, Plato's account of embodied personhood is not accurately conflated with Cartesian dualism. Plato's dualism is more appropriately seen in the contrast between the ideal disembodied person and the embodied one than in the contrast between mind (...) or soul and body. (shrink)